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1. MISTAKING AN OUTCOME FOR A
COVARIATE
Donald Rubin’s lucid discussion of censoring by
death comments on several issues: he warns against
mistakes, describes obstacles to inference that might
be surmounted within a given investigation, and dis-
cusses barriers to inference that direct attention to
new data from outside the current investigation. Cen-
soring by death creates outcomes that are defined
only contingently, such as quality of life defined only
for survivors. If the contingency is an outcome of
treatment—if survival could be affected by the
treatment—then, as Rubin demonstrates, it is a se-
rious analytical mistake to act as if the contingency
were a covariate, a variable unaffected by treatment,
when studying the effect of the treatment on the
contingently defined outcome. This is one instance
of a family of interlinked errors in which an analysis
uses an outcome of treatment as if it were a covari-
ate measured before treatment. Other instances in
this same family are adjusting for an outcome as if it
were a covariate (Rosenbaum, 1984), or attempting
to define an interaction effect between a treatment
and an outcome of treatment (Rosenbaum, 2004).
One of the several advantages of defining outcomes
of treatment as comparisons of potential responses
under alternative treatments (Neyman, 1923; Ru-
bin, 1974) is that it becomes difficult to make these
mistakes: outcomes exist in several versions depend-
ing upon the treatment, whereas covariates exist in
a single version.
Figure 1 depicts the mistake Rubin warns against.
It is a simulated randomized experiment, with N =
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Fig. 1. Comparison of quality of life.
650 subjects, of whom n= 325 were randomized to
treatment where 16 died, and m = 325 were ran-
domized to control, where 111 died, and Figure 1
depicts quality of life scores for survivors. Begin-
ning with the structure as Rubin develops it, I will
propose a somewhat different analysis. In Section 2
notation describes a completely randomized experi-
ment of the type depicted in Figure 1, with censoring
by death but without covariates; then Section 3 pro-
poses a method of analysis that separates empirical
evidence of treatment effect from diverging patient
preference orderings of death and various qualities
of life.
2. CENSORING BY DEATH IN A
COMPLETELY RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT
There is a finite population of N subjects, i =
1, . . . ,N , who have given informed consent to be
randomized to receive either the treatment condi-
tion or the control condition, where subject i would
exhibit response rT i under treatment or response rCi
under control. Write R for {(rT i, rCi), i= 1, . . . ,N}
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for the potential responses of the N subjects, which
are fixed features of the finite population of N sub-
jects. Of the N subjects, a fixed number, n, with 1≤
n<N , are picked at random for treatment, denoted
Zi = 1, the remaining m=N − n receiving control,
denoted Zi = 0, so that n =
∑N
i=1Zi, and all
(N
n
)
possible treatment assignments Z = (Z1, . . . ,ZN )
T
have the same probability
(N
n
)
−1
. The response, Ri,
actually observed from i is rT i if Zi = 1 or rCi if
Zi = 0, and the observed data are O = {(Ri, Zi), i=
1, . . . ,N}. Here R is fixed but O is random, and the
distribution of O is created from R by the known
probability distribution used in the random assign-
ment of treatments. The task of inference in a com-
pletely randomized experiment is to say something
about the effects caused by the treatment, R, from
the observed data, O, and the known distribution of
treatment assignments. This commonplace descrip-
tion of a randomized experiment is found, for in-
stance, in Welch (1937), and it merged certain ideas
from Fisher (1935) about randomization inference
and certain ideas from Neyman (1923) about treat-
ment effects.
Following Rubin’s approach, I will understand “cen-
soring by death” to mean that the response is a nu-
merical measure of “quality of life” at a particular
time, say a year, after treatment, taking values in
a subset Q of the real line, but the measure is not
defined if the subject has “died” before that time,
in which case the letter “D” appears in place of
the numerical measure, so (rT i, rCi) could be a pair
of numbers, a D paired with a number, a number
paired with a D, or a pair of D’s. The mistake men-
tioned in Section 1 consists in setting aside the D’s
when studying quality of life, and as Rubin’s dis-
cussion makes very clear, setting aside the deaths
means not estimating the effects of the treatment
on quality of life.
It is sometimes the case that deaths can be com-
pared ordinally to various qualities of life, even though
numerical comparisons are not possible; that is, Q∪
{D} may be a totally ordered set, with strict in-
equality ≺ and with equality-or-inequality , but
the elements of Q ∪ {D} cannot be manipulated
arithmetically to yield averages or expected values.
One common view, perhaps the default view, might
order death as inferior to any quality of life, and
that view might have such diverse sources as re-
ligious teachings or the very different observation
that a living person can end his or her life, so re-
maining alive with a given quality of life reveals a
preference for that quality of life over death. This
common or default view is, no doubt, not universally
held, and a particular person might order death or
D as preferable to the lowest or worst qualities of
life in Q. The analysis that I will describe can ac-
commodate any total ordering of Q∪ {D}; it need
not place D below all of Q. Faced with diverse pref-
erences among different patients, one can carry out
the proposed analysis with several different place-
ments of D in Q∪{D}, in which case the empirical
results of a single experiment might speak differently
to different patients, and each patient could select
the analysis that corresponds to that patient’s own
evaluation. This is illustrated in Section 3. When a
total ordering of Q∪{D} is possible, to what extent
does it facilitate inferences about the effects caused
by treatments? More abstractly, what can be said
about treatment effects when outcomes take values
in a totally ordered set that lacks algebraic opera-
tions?
3. THE QUALITY OF LIFE AMID DEATH
In the randomized experiment, we observe n of
the N potential responses to treatment and we do
not observe m of the N potential responses to treat-
ment, and we observem of theN potential responses
to control, but we do not observe n of the N po-
tential responses to control. Let RT (1)  RT (2) 
· · ·  RT (n) denote the ordered, observed responses
to treatment, including the D’s, for the n treated
subjects, Zi = 1, and let R˜T (1)  R˜T (2)  · · ·  R˜T (m)
denote the unobserved, ordered responses to treat-
ment for the m control subjects, Zi = 0. In Figure
1, there are 16 D’s observed in the treated group,
so 16 of the RT (i)’s are D’s, and if deaths are placed
below any quality of life by , then the RT (1) = · · ·=
RT (16) =D. Similarly, let RC(1) RC(2)  · · · RC(m)
denote the ordered, observed responses to control
for the m control subjects, Zi = 0, and let R˜C(1) 
R˜C(2)  · · ·  R˜C(n) denote the ordered, unobserved
responses to control for the n treated subjects, Zi =
1. Note that, although R is fixed, the RT (i), R˜T (j),
RC(k) and R˜C(ℓ) are random variables with distri-
butions created from R by random assignment of
treatments; moreover, the RT (i), R˜T (j), RC(k) and
R˜C(ℓ) may be numbers in Q or the letter D.
Fix an i, 1≤ i≤ n, and consider the bivariate ran-
dom vector Υ(i) = 〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉. Here, RT (i) is the
observed ith largest response of the n responses of
the n subjects randomly assigned to treatment, and
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R˜C(i) is the unobserved ith largest response that
would have been observed from these same n sub-
jects had they all received the control instead, and
either coordinate of Υ(i) may be a D. If n were odd
and i= (n+ 1)/2, then Υ(i) = 〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉 would
compare the median of the n observed responses, in-
cluding deaths, to treatment among n treated sub-
jects to the median of the n unobserved responses,
including deaths, that would have been observed
among these same n treated subjects had they all re-
ceived control instead of treatment. Notice carefully
that there may be no individual i with (rT i, rCi) =
〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉, and the quantity RT (i)− R˜C(i) is not
generally defined because either RT (i) or R˜C(i) may
equal D.
Because R˜C(i) is not observed, Υ(i) too is not ob-
served. An exact, randomization-based confidence
set for Υ(i) will now be defined. Recall that C(i) is a
1−α confidence set for an unobserved random vec-
tor Υ(i) if (i) C(i) is a function of the observed data,
O, and (ii) 1−α≤Pr{Υ(i) ∈ C(i)}; see Weiss (1955).
Proposition 1 rephrases a result due to Fligner and
Wolfe (1976, page 83, B; 1979); see Remark 2 follow-
ing the proposition. The confidence set for Υ(i) is
the observed RT (i) and an interval for R˜C(i) formed
from two of the observed RC(j)’s. Notice that the
interval may have one or both endpoints as a D.
Proposition 1 (Fligner and Wolfe, 1976, 1979).
If 1≤ a≤ b≤m are two integers such that
1−α=
b∑
j=a
(m+n−i−j
m−j
) (i+j−1
j
)
(N
m
) ,(1)
then C(i) = {〈RT (i), w〉 :w ∈ [RC(a),RC(b)]} is a 1−α
confidence set for Υ(i).
Remark 2. Fligner and Wolfe (1976) derive a
prediction interval for an order statistic from a fu-
ture sample starting from i.i.d. sampling of an infi-
nite population, but it is straightforward to derive
their combinatorial result, namely their Corollary
4.1 in Fligner andWolfe (1976), from random assign-
ment of treatments in a finite population, and from
this, the coverage of their prediction interval follows.
Specifically, (i) start by assuming the N fixed, or-
dered responses to control are untied, rC(1) ≺ rC(2) ≺
· · · ≺ rC(N); (ii) then,
(m+n−i−j
m−j
) (i+j−1
j
)
of the
(N
m
)
possible random assignments Z produce Table 1,
yielding (1) in agreement with Corollary 4.1 in Fligner
and Wolfe (1976); (iii) finally, note with Fligner and
Wolfe (1976, page 84) or by other methods that ties
among the rCi make the prediction interval conser-
vative.
At first, adopt the default view, that places death
or D below all qualities of life in Q. Then, in Fig-
ure 1, there are n=m= 325 subjects in each group,
and theRT (i) =D for i= 1, . . . ,16, RC(j) =D for i=
1, . . . ,111. With i = (n + 1)/2 = (325 + 1)/2 = 163,
the median observed response in the treated group is
RT (163) = 4.19. With a= 138, b= 189, expression (1)
equals 0.951, and [RC(a), RC(b)] = [3.81, 4.16], so the
95% confidence set for Υ(i) is C(i) = {〈4.19, w〉 :w ∈
[3.81, 4.16]}. This 95% confidence set excludes the
possibility that, taking account of the unequal death
rates, the median quality of life score would have
been higher for the n = 325 treated subjects had
they all received the control instead, despite the ap-
pearance of Figure 1.
Table 2 gives C(i) for i = 41, 82, 163, 244 and
285, for the eighth’s, quartiles and median. Notice
that for i= 82 for the lower quartile, the 95% confi-
dence set contrasts the observed lower quartile in the
treated group, RT (82) = 3.49, to an interval [RC(61),
RC(106)] = [D, D], so with 95% confidence the lower
quartile of the treated group would have been “death”
had all n treated subjects received control.
Consider now a hypothetical patient who views
qualities of life greater than or equal to 3.5 as bet-
ter than death, but qualities below 3.5 as inferior to
death. What does the same randomized trial say to
Table 1
Cross-classification of untied potential responses to control,
rCi, by treatment assignment, Zi, dividing at R˜C(i)
≺ R˜C(i) R˜C(i) ≻ R˜C(i) Total
Treated i− 1 1 n− i n
Control j 0 m− j m
Table 2
Inference under the default order: 95% confidence
set C(i) for Υ(i)
Quantile i (a, b) RT (i) [RC(a), RC(b)]
Lower eighth 41 (25, 60) 3.10 [D, D]
Lower quartile 82 (61, 106) 3.49 [D, D]
Median 163 (138, 189) 4.19 [3.81, 4.16]
Upper quartile 244 (221, 266) 4.79 [4.43, 4.94]
Upper eighth 285 (267, 302) 5.20 [4.98, 5.58]
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such a hypothetical patient with these hypothetical
preferences? In Figure 1, there are 66 treated pa-
tients and no control patients with qualities below
3.5. As a result, with this placement ofD inQ∪{D},
the RC(j) are unchanged, but the RT (i) reflect the
new order, with RT (i) ≺ D ≺ 3.5 for i = 1, . . . ,66,
RT (i) = D ≺ 3.5 for i = 67, . . . ,82, and D ≺ 3.5 
RT (i) for i= 83, . . . , n= 325. Then C(41) = {〈3.23, w〉 :
w ∈ [D,D]} where 3.23≺D so, with 95% confidence,
the lower eighth is worse if all n treated subjects had
received control, but C(82) = {〈D, w〉 :w ∈ [D,D]} so
the lower quartiles would be the same, and the re-
maining three intervals in Table 2 are unchanged.
With the default order, treatment appeared supe-
rior, but with the hypothetical order, control ap-
pears better at the lower eighth and worse at the
median.
Perhaps there is a correct placement of death, D,
amid the possible qualities of life, Q, or perhaps
not. Certain religious teachings would place D be-
low all of Q, but that view is not universal: Seneca
(49 A.D., page 92), wrote: “He will live badly who
does not know how to die well.” The randomized ex-
periment in Section 2 provides no new insight into
the proper placement of D in Q∪{D}. However, for
each given placement of D in Q∪ {D}, the experi-
ment provides information about how a group of n
people will fare under treatment and under control.
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